The six DCPR 2034 redevelopment regulations explained
Mumbai has six distinct redevelopment regulations under DCPR 2034. Which one applies depends on your building's age, location, and current authorisation status. The carpet area bonus, FSI multipliers, and developer margins differ significantly across these.
| Reg | Applies to | FSI / Entitlement | Member carpet bonus |
|---|---|---|---|
| 33(7) | Cessed buildings (pre-30/9/1969) in island city under MHADA cess | Max of: 3.0 FSI OR rehab + 50/60/70% incentive (single/2–5/6+ plots) | +5% / +8% / +15% (min 300 sqft, max 1292 sqft) |
| 33(7A) | Dilapidated authorized non-cessed buildings in suburbs (declared unsafe) | Same as 33(7) — rehab + 50/60/70% incentive | +5% / +8% / +15% (min 300 sqft, max 1292 sqft) |
| 33(7B) | Non-cessed buildings 30+ years old in suburbs (not necessarily unsafe) | Rehab + 15% incentive FSI, OR 10 sqm extra per member, whichever is more | +108 sqft per member (10 sqm), capped at permissible FSI |
| 33(9) | Cluster redevelopment of cessed buildings (min 4000 sqm) | Up to 4.0 FSI + cluster premiums + 35% fungible | +15% (composite) min 300 / max 1292 sqft |
| 33(10) | Slum Rehabilitation (SRA) — pre-2011 hutments | FSI tied to land-rate ÷ construction-rate ratio; effectively 2–4 FSI | Min 300 sqft per eligible hutment (no bonus formula) |
| 33(20A) | MHADA society redevelopment (up to 4000 sqm) | Rehab + 15% incentive; Premium Policy applicable up to 4000 sqm | +15% of authorized BUA as incentive (capped at permissible FSI) |
Across all categories, an additional 35% fungible FSI applies on the rehab + incentive area, which goes to the developer as saleable. This is the single biggest driver of developer economics in Mumbai redevelopment.
33(7) cessed buildings get the most generous FSI (3.0 or rehab+50% whichever higher). Combined with island-city market rates (₹40-70K/sqft for new flats), developer margins often exceed 50%. That's why you see aggressive bidding for 33(7) projects — and that's the leverage members have. The calculator's margin output tells you exactly how much cushion the developer has. If it shows 50%+, push for 1.25-1.5x corpus and 5-8% more carpet than the offer.
33(7B) non-cessed projects are the opposite — incentive FSI is only 15% (vs 50% for 33(7)), member carpet bonuses are modest, and suburban market rates (₹18-30K/sqft) are lower. Many 33(7B) projects show negative or single-digit margins on paper. If your project is 33(7B) and the math shows MARGINAL or INVIABLE, the developer will either delay execution, cut quality, or eventually try to renegotiate terms downward.
The four levers society members negotiate on
Once you know the developer's margin from the calculator, focus negotiation on these four levers (in order of impact):
- 1. New carpet area entitlement. Insist on the maximum permissible under your regulation. Get the carpet area explicitly written into the development agreement in sqft (not as a percentage). For 33(7) single-plot, that's existing + 5% bonus, minimum 300 sqft, maximum 1292 sqft. Many developers offer the bare minimum 300 sqft to small-flat owners (under 285 sqft existing) — make sure you get YOUR existing + 5%, not just the floor.
- 2. Corpus fund. Lump-sum cash per member. Typical 33(7) corpus: ₹5-15L per family. If calculator margin shows 40%+, push for the higher end. Corpus is paid in 2-3 tranches — insist on first tranche at vacating (not at IOD), with the rest tied to specific construction milestones.
- 3. Rent during construction. Should match market rent for similar-sized rental in the same neighborhood (not the cheaper one 5km away). Get a bank guarantee from a scheduled bank covering 110% of total rent for the entire construction period. Most disputes happen when developer rent stops paying after 24 months and project is still 12 months from completion.
- 4. Hardship / shifting allowance. One-time ₹50K-2L per family for moving costs. Smaller line item but easy to win in negotiation.
Red flags in a redevelopment proposal
- No bank guarantee for rehab construction. Insist on a 110% bank guarantee from a scheduled commercial bank covering both rehab construction and rent. Without this, if developer goes bankrupt mid-project, members lose everything.
- Vague carpet area definition. "Approximate" carpet area, super built-up references, or absence of explicit sqft is a setup for shortchange. Insist on RERA carpet area as the legal definition.
- No completion deadline penalty. Should be 5-10% of new flat value per year of delay beyond agreed date. Without penalty, projects routinely run 2-4 years late.
- Developer claims sole rights over unsold flats. Standard, but check the price-floor clause — some agreements let developer sell at any price (including below market), affecting future property value of your re-developed flat.
- Mention of FSI "subject to availability" or "post-policy clearance". Means developer hasn't done due diligence on what's actually buildable. Walk away if FSI projections are conditional.
- One-sided arbitration clause. Mumbai-based, single-arbitrator, developer-chosen arbitrator — all bad. Insist on Bombay High Court jurisdiction or 3-member arbitral tribunal.
What this calculator does NOT model
- TDR (Transferable Development Rights) loading. Many redevelopment projects use TDR to push FSI beyond base+incentive. The calc shows the base case; TDR can add 0.5-1.0 FSI beyond what's shown.
- Road-widening setbacks. If plot is affected by DP Road widening, usable plot area drops 10-30%. Critical for plots near arterial roads (Western Express Highway, Eastern Express Highway, S V Road, L B S Marg).
- Height restrictions. Coastal zones (CRZ), airport funnel zones (south Andheri, east Vile Parle, Sahar), heritage precincts (Fort, Colaba, Khotachiwadi) — all cap height, limiting realisable FSI even if computed FSI is higher.
- IOD/OC delays. BMC building permission cycles add 18-30 months to projects. The calc assumes construction starts on day 1.
- Cluster redevelopment premium negotiations. For 33(9) cluster, developer pays cluster premium to MHADA which is highly variable.
- Multiple-developer scenarios. If your society is dealing with 3+ developer bids, JV structures and exit clauses add complexity not captured here.